The Delhi Police has clarified that the recent Lieutenant Governor notification designating all police stations in the capital as locations for police personnel to give evidence and depose before courts via video conferencing will be implemented only after hearing all stakeholders.
In a statement, the police said Union Home Minister Amit Shah will meet with members of the Bar to discuss the matter. The notification, issued on the 13th August by the Delhi Lieutenant Governor, designated all police stations in the national capital as places where police personnel can present evidence and depose before courts through video conferencing.
More than two weeks after Delhi’s Lieutenant Governor (L-G) V K Saxena issued a notification allowing police to virtually present evidence in courts from police stations, the Delhi Police has put on hold the directive until all stakeholders are heard by the Union Home Ministry. The decision comes against the backdrop of the Capital’s lawyers staging multiple protests calling for the withdrawal of the notification.
Following the Delhi Police’s decision to place a hold on L-G Saxena’s directive, the lawyers have now decided to call the strike off. “It has been decided that the Union Home Minister would meet the representatives of the Bar to discuss the issue with an open mind,” a statement from the office of the Commissioner of Police reads. “In the meantime, the operation of the said notification on the ground would only be carried out after hearing all stakeholders,” the statement adds.
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On 24-8-2025, a practicing lawyer filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality, validity, and constitutional propriety of Notification No. F.97/1/2024/HG/2208-2223 dated 13-8-2025 (‘Impugned Notification’), issued by the Home (General) Department, Government of NCT of Delhi (’GNCTD’), with the approval of the Delhi’s Lieutenant Governor, whereby all police stations in Delhi were declared as “designated places” for deposition of police officers/personnel through video conferencing. The petitioner highlighted that neither the Bar bodies of Advocates nor Judicial authorities were consulted while issuing the impugned notification.
The petitionersubmitted that the impugned notification strikes at the very root of the right to fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, which has been held by the Supreme Court as the heart of criminal jurisprudence. It was further submitted that by allowing police officers to depose from their own stations, the neutrality of the environment in which the testimony was recorded would be destroyed as a witness deposing from his own workplace, amidst colleagues and superiors, could not be equated to one deposing before a judicial officer in an open courtroom. Further it would also vitiate the cardinal tenet that “justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done” and possibility of subtle influence, departmental coercion, or rehearsed testimony would be inescapable.
The petitioner highlighted that Supreme Court has consistently underscored that the right to a fair trial is not a mere procedural formality but part of the basic structure of the Constitution and any executive order that prejudices this right would be unconstitutional and must be quashed at the inception. The petitioner submitted that essence of the impugned notification would be ultra vires the Constitution, as the procedure envisaged in the notification fails the constitutional test of being ‘just, fair and reasonable’ and would impinge the right to life as envisaged under Article 21.
It was further submitted that the impugned notification creates a patently unreasonable classification between the police officials and civilians by permitting police witnesses to enjoy the convenience of testifying from their offices while others remained bound to depose before a Court of law and such an unequal treatment of similarly situated classes of witnesses was arbitrary and offended the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The petitioner submitted that by unilaterally designating police stations as deposition centres, the Executive has usurped judicial powers as the procedure for recording of the evidence lies strictly within judicial domain. This violates Article 50 of the Constitution which mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive and was contrary to the principle of delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate cannot further delegate) and amounted to excessive delegation.
It was further submitted that the impugned notification undermines the principle of open justice by allowing depositions to be recorded in police stations, which were not public spaces. This would reduce the accountability of witnesses and public character of criminal trials, violating Articles 21 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
It was submitted that the impugned notification, by permitting the police officers to depose from their own police stations without judicial supervision violates the letter and spirit of Section 308 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’) which expressly requires that the evidence be recorded in the presence of the accused and under the control and supervision of the Presiding Judge.
It was further submitted that Delhi High Court Video Conferencing Rules, 2020 (‘2020 Rules’), permits the use of video conferencing only on a case-to-case basis at the discretion of the Court, and strictly from neutral and authorised centres such as VC cabins in Courts or notified facilities; however, the same has been illegally circumvented by the impugned notification by granting a blanket executive permission to police officials to depose from their own stations, which are partisan spaces under the control of the witness himself and would directly undermine the judicial control envisaged under the Rules.
It was submitted that allowing police officers to testify from police stations creates an unacceptable risk of witness tampering, coaching, and a break in the chain of evidence as a police witness could easily be tutored or coached by their superiors or colleagues in confines of their own office. Further, if a witness needed to be confronted with physical evidence, the integrity of that evidence would be immediately compromised, thereby rendering the entire exercise futile and opening avenues for systemic corruption and manipulation.
The petitioner pointed out that Evidence Act, 1872 (‘Evidence Act’) places a high premium on immediate observation and confrontation and the physical presence of the witness in the courtroom allowed the judge to observe their demeanour, body language, facial expressions, and overall conduct which are critical for evaluating credibility. It was submitted that the impugned notification by substituting this immediate, physical observation with a two-dimensional, distant video feed, has deprived the court of its most crucial tool for truth-finding and has also severely hampered the ability of the defence to confront the witness, as a police witness in their own office, would easily be able to consult notes, be prompted, or even have a superior present off-camera which would be a direct assault on the right to a fair trial.
The petitioner pointed out that the impugned notification is in direct conflict with State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai, (2003) 4 SCC 601. Therein the Supreme Court upheld video conferencing for recording evidence but subject to strict safeguards. However, the impugned notification by designating police stations as a venue, acts in defiance of binding precedent thereby compromising neutrality, creating perception of bias, and undermining the solemnity of judicial testimony.
The petitioner thus, submitted that the impugned notification is violative of Articles 14, 21, and 50 of the Constitution, inconsistent with the Evidence Act and BNSS, contrary to the Delhi High Court Video Conferencing Rules, and opposed to binding precedent of the Supreme Court. Therefore, if the impugned notification is not struck down, it would irreparably prejudice accused persons, compromise judicial neutrality, and corrode public confidence in the rule of law. The petitioner thus filed the present petition for the quashing of the impugned order as unconstitutional and ultra vires.
The Bar Council of India (‘BCI’) has also formally requested the Lieutenant Governor, GNCTD, on 25-8-2025 to withdraw the impugned notification citing concerns of fair trial, effective cross examination and lack of judicial control under the impugned notification and also stated that such significant changes to the criminal procedure should only be made after a collaborative discussion involving the Bar, the Judiciary, and other key stakeholders.
[Kapil Madan v. State (NCT of Delhi), Writ Petition filed on 24-8-2025]